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"OTHER SPACES" IN LEGAL PEDAGOGY
Lolita Buckner Inniss*
There is an increasing focus upon the material and metaphoric spatial dimen-
sions of various academic disciplines, including law. This essay considers the
spatial dimensions of legal pedagogy, focusing on Critical Race Theory (CRT).
The essay first explains the "critical program" in law and how CRT grows out of
it. The essay then suggests that the critical program, and especially CRT, is as
much a human geographic or spatial construct as it is a social, political or his-
toric one, and briefly describes the nature of human geography and legal geogra-
phy. It next considers how metaphors for understanding CRT's position in legal
pedagogy are found in some of Foucault's work on geography. In "Des Espaces
Autres" ("Other Spaces"), Foucault argues that there are three distinct social
spaces in society: real spaces, utopias, and heterotopias. What unites them, Fou-
cault suggests, is a space that includes elements of all of these spaces, a space that
he calls the mirror. Applying this frame, this essay posits that CRT, both the
explicit courses on the topic and the discipline itself, should be "re-mapped", that
is, barriers to its inclusion in the broader legal pedagogy should be eliminated. In
this way, CRT can function as a Foucauldian mirror rather than a heterotopia in
legal pedagogy.
1. INTRODUCTION
This essay considers the spatial position of Critical Race Theory (CRT)
in legal pedagogy. It draws on literature on human geography, with a
particular focus on Michel Foucault's "Des Espaces Autres" ("Other
Spaces"), in which Foucault asserts that there are three distinct social
spaces in society: real spaces, utopias, and heterotopias. What unites
them, he suggests, is a space that includes elements of all of these spaces,
a space that Foucault calls the mirror. This essay posits that CRT, both the
explicit courses on the topic and the discipline itself, should function as
Foucauldian mirrors in the law school classroom, in the law school curric-
ulum and within the broader academic community.
This essay addresses these points first by exploring the nature of the
"critical program" in law: Critical Law Studies (CLS), other critical disci-
plines, and CRT itself. It then briefly considers how the literature on
Professor, Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, A.B.
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human geography and especially some of Foucault's work on the geogra-
phy of spaces offers a useful frame for understanding criticality. It then
applies these spatial metaphors to law school CRT courses and to law
school pedagogy in general. Finally, this essay describes some of the bar-
riers to altering the current spatial dynamics of CRT and argues for a
remapping of the existing Foucauldian spatial relationship in the context
of CRT.
II. THE "CRITICAL PROGRAM" AND CRITICAL RACE THEORY
The adjective "critical" is one that has been appended to more and
more scholarly endeavors over the last seventy-five years. "Critical" in
this context does not, of course, have the common lay meaning of disap-
proving of someone or something (though critical studies may sometimes
be critical in that way). Rather, "critical" in this sense refers to closely
inquiring into the nature of a thing or an idea, not necessarily to alter it or
undermine it, but rather to problematize it, that is, to expose vital ques-
tions and problems about a thing or a concept. Being critical means que-
rying mainstream, classical legal thought, especially of the variety that
views law as a structured, coherent whole that is typically accessed via
the application of long-established, logical, legal rules and norms.1 Being
critical often means adopting an interdisciplinary, intersectional, spectral
(as in lying along a spectrum) approach to solutions. This is in contrast to
the binary solutions that are common to mainstream approaches. Being
critical means avoiding essentialism or claims of universal validity, as
such constructs may "mask relations of power."2 At a minimum, to the
extent that adherents of critical approaches employ essentialist constructs,
they are urged to embrace "strategic essentialism,"3 adopting universal
norms only to achieve a greater good for the many or to undermine struc-
tures of oppression. Even in cases of using strategic essentialism, it is
crucial to critical practice that definitions be generated by the group itself
and not by external hegemonic actors.4
Finally, being critical means rejecting false dichotomies and instead
understanding that there are all too often more than two alternatives and
that among them several, and not just one, are valid choices.5 Consider
an example from criminal law: verdicts are often understood as the choice
1. For a discussion of the nature and function of classical legal thought, see, e.g.,
DUNCAN KENNEDY, TOWARD AN HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF LEGAL CONSCIOUS-
NESS: THE CASE OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA, 1850-1940 (1980).
2. SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE AND CUL-
TURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 21 (1998).
3. Id.
4. LISA NAKAMURA, CYBERTYPES: RACE, ETHiNcITY AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET 128
(2002).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee, Binary Determinations of Guilt or Innocence: Reading Between the
Lines of People v. Du, 37 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 181, 183 (2003) ("the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence is a primary example of the binary predicate: the defen-
dant must be either guilty or innocent"). See also Leonard V. Kaplan, Shame:
Bergman on Responsibility and Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1166 (2003); PAUL H.
ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
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between "guilty" or "not guilty," elections made by the finder of fact
after proofs have been entered. While many issues in criminal law are
decided based on whether criminal conduct has occurred and can be
proved, there is a whole region of cases whose outcome is determined
based on "deterministic excuses" offered by the accused such as duress,
insanity and provocation.6 Nonetheless, the false dichotomy between
"guilty" and "not guilty" is frequently exploited in discussions of how
criminal law operates. It is perhaps equally as important to avoid false
harmonies in expressing critical points of view. Again, looking at the ex-
ample of criminal law, in lay terms, and sometimes even in legal terms,
"not guilty" is often conflated with "innocent".7 A critical approach to
criminal law would include an examination not only of the agency of the
accused, but of the structures that shape our understandings of criminal
law.8
One of the best known critical endeavors in law, and the one from
which many other such endeavors stem, is Critical Legal Studies, or CLS.
CLS is a school of thought that mediates for the admission of multiple
ways of understanding law and law-like regimes.9 CLS rejects many of
the claims of traditional legal theorizing, and especially the idea that law
is a neutral set of rules or practices. CLS further rejects the notion that
general legal principles are embodied in judicial opinions, and that by
legal analysis the correct principle can be reached and then dispassion-
ately applied. Rather, CLS maintains that law is an instrument of power
and questions the fundamental legitimacy of traditional legal norms.
Some early critics asserted that CLS is essentially a polemical internal as-
sault on traditional legal studies, and that it lacked sufficient intellectual
rigor or nuance. 10 Even within the discipline there have been many con-
trasting opinions about the nature of CLS and how it relates to other
scholarly endeavors.11
While CLS adherents may disagree about the sum total of its warrants,
one of the touchstones of CLS is the belief that law, despite its universal-
izing formalism,2 is inherently political, and hence the actions of legal
agents are not constrained by rational responses to texts and precedents,
6. Mark Kelrman, Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 591, 598, 611 (1981).
7. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE
O.J. SIMPSON CASE 38 (1997).
8. Graham Wright & Jane Hill, Victims, Crime and Criminal Justice, in STUDENT HAND-
BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 105, 115 (John Muncie & David Wilson
eds., 2004).
9. For a description and synthesis of much of the early CLS movement, see Alan Hunt,
The Theory of Critical Legal Studies, 6 O.J.L.S. 1 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984)
(suggesting that CLS offers little by way of constructive principles and is nihilistic
in its approach). See generally Owen Fiss, Death of the Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1986).
11. See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks & Mary Jo Newborn, Critical Race Theory and Classical Liberal
Civil Rights Scholarship: A Distinction Without a Difference?, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 787
(1994); William A. Edmundson, Transparency and Indeterminacy in the Liberal Critique
of Critical Legal Studies, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 557, 558 (1993).
12. ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 5-14 (1986).
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but instead are shaped largely by socio-political forces. Critical Race The-
ory, or CRT, is but one type of critical approach to law and other disci-
plines that has grown from CLS. CRT, while not susceptible to a single
definition, offers a number of unique features.
First, CRT was developed in order to address the extent to which CLS,
despite its goal of challenging the hegemony of mainstream thought,
failed to give a sufficient account of the role that race played in main-
stream formulations. Recognizing the "racedness" of American history,
society and culture is crucial to the endeavor. As one scholar observed:
"Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which ra-
cism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs
that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feel-
ings and opinions about nonwhites ... ."13 In addition, much of CRT
scholarship is exemplified by a critique of liberal ideology.14 Racial anti-
subordination is an explicit goal of CRT, and CRT adherents strive toward
this goal by de-privileging and deconstructing certain legal methodolo-
gies. This means, for example, sometimes using personal stories and
anecdotes to illustrate points instead of relying solely upon arms length,
third party recitations of facts--this is another unique feature of CRT.
Some of the most iconic scholarship in CRT uses storytelling.15 However,
while race is clearly central to CRT, a central principle of CRT is the no-
tion that race is primarily socially constructed. CRT brings to several dis-
ciplines, both critical and mainstream, what one commentator has called a
"perspectivist aesthetic."16 Reciprocally, CRT is itself informed by a num-
ber of other critical disciplines.
13. Charles Lawrence, The ld, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
14. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography
1993, A Year of Transition, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 160-61 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of
Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. NMAMI L. REV. 127 (1987). Wil-
liams tells the story of being excluded from a Benetton store, ostensibly because of
her race. Williams defined "spirit-murder" as the psychological damage caused by
racially motivated abuses. See id. at 127, 129-30. Possible interpretations of Wil-
liams' notion are "spirit involuntary manslaughter" (unintentional but culpable
race-based spirit killing, such as engaging in racist behavior or speech without re-
gard for the substantial possibility that it may offend) and spiritual voluntary man-
slaughter (intentional, racially motivated race-based spirit killing done in the heat of
passion-consider for example the comedian Michael Richards who, in a fit of an-
ger, used the "n- word" and other racial epithets to abuse black hecklers during his
live comedy show). See also Jessica Heslam, Nutty Neighbor Shocks Nation With Racist
Rant, Bos. HERALD, Nov. 21, 2006, News, at 3. For a general discussion of the use of
storytelling in legal academia, see Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law
Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 714-15 (1992). See also Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991).
16. Pierre Schlag, Commentary, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047,
1085 (2002) ("The introduction and development of a perspectivist aesthetic in
American law owes much to feminist and critical race theory scholarship of the
1980s and 1990s.").
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Among the various areas of critical thought that have grown from
CRT are other "outsider"17 theories such as Black Critical Theory (Black-
crit),18 Latino Critical Theory (Latcrit),19 Feminist Legal Studies (FLS),20
Queer Theory,21 Critical Race Feminism22 and Critical Disability Theory.23
17. "Outsiders" describes persons who inhabit the margins of society, and includes
members of "outgroups, groups whose marginality defines the boundaries of the
mainstream, whose voice and perspective-whose consciousness-has [sic] been
suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Opposi-
tionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412 (1989) (footnote
omitted).
18. Blackcrit theory offers a critical perspective on the law and politics relevant to ra-
cism against Blacks. Hope Lewis, Reflections On "Blackcrit Theory": Human Rights, 45
VILL. L. REV. 1075 (2000).
19. Scholar Kevin Johnson has described LatCrit as "a group of progressive law profes-
sors engaged in theorizing about the ways in which the Law and its structures,
processes and discourses affect people of color, especially the Latina/o communi-
ties." Kevin R. Johnson, Celebrating LatCrit Theory: What Do We Do When the Music
Stops?, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 753, 754-55 (2000).
20. See generally FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY VOL. I (Frances E. Olsen ed., 1995); FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); ALICE ECHOLS, DARING
TO BE BAD RADICAL FEMINISM IN AMERICA 1967-1975 (1989); Marie Ashe, Mind's Op-
portunity: Birthing a Post-Structuralist Feminist Jurisprudence, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1129
(1987); Claire Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation of Feminist Legal
Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1987-88).
21. Queer theory is not necessarily characterized by a specific methodology or theme,
but in general questions the way in which sexuality is connected to identity and
critiques the rampant heteronormativity of the prevailing culture. "One scholar
identifies four major claims of queer theory: (1) sexuality is central, not marginal, to
the construction of meaning and political power; (2) identity is performative, not
natural; (3) political struggle is better understood as ironic parody than as earnest
liberation; and (4) popular culture provides a unique insight into the everyday oper-
ation of political power that may under certain circumstances transform, rather than
simply mirror, status quo power relations." Nancy Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist
Legal Theory, 23 Wis. J.L. GENDER & Soc'Y 201, 223 (2008) (citing Susan Burgess,
Queer (Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy: Lawrence v. Texas' Makeover of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 59 POL. RES. Q. 401, 401 (2006)); see generally EvE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK,
EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1992).
Racial and gender norms are firmly entrenched in our society; we are all ex-
pected, for the most part, to be transparent on matters of personal racial or gender
identity. This means that sometimes strangers feel that they can ask and receive an
answer to the question "What are you?" when it comes to racial identity. As a
society, we are even more demanding when it comes to understanding the gender
identity of persons. Most individuals are very uncomfortable with "Pat-like" (the
Saturday Night Live character with ambiguous gender) persons. Interestingly,
though, we seem to feel much less willing to ask the gender of adult strangers (Im-
agine-"Excuse me sir or madam, are you a man or a woman?"). For discussions of
the gender-ambiguous character "Pat" and gender ambiguity, see, e.g., I. Bennett
Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 14-15 (2008) (".....
[Pat] "discombobulates everyone with her gender ambiguity, her genderless
clothes, her very illegibility."); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex
and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence 105
YALE L.J. 1, 18 n.44 (1995) ("Pat notoriously is of indeterminate sex, yet we are
thrown into confusion not because she sends out conflicting gender signals, but
precisely because she seems to send out none at all-she is undifferentiated.").
22. See generally ADRIEN KATHERINE WING, CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (2d ed.
2003); Mary Jo Wiggins, Foreword: The Future of Intersectionality and Critical Race Femi-
nism, 11 J. CoNTEmp. LEGAL ISSUES 677 (2001).
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One critical discipline, Critical Whiteness Studies, seems from its name to
exist in direct contradiction to CRT. However, Critical Whiteness, with its
focus on understanding the way in which members of various ethnic
groups "become white" and in understanding the nature of white privi-
lege, is actually an important corollary to CRT.24 There are also a number
of Critical Discourse theories such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA),25
Critical Rhetoric26 and Critical Legal Rhetoric (CLR)27 that offer important
insights into the use of language and rhetorical constructions. These vari-
ous critical genres, while offering their own distinct approaches, are more
and more informing CRT. Much of this is seen in the discussion of "inter-
sectional analysis"-the undertaking of multifaceted analysis based upon
an examination of the ways in which various socially or culturally con-
structed categories interact. 28 Critical disciplines are also increasingly be-
23. Critical Disability Theory concerns itself in large part with the way in which the
notion of "disability" should be understood. It rejects biomedical models of disa-
bility and favors an understanding of disability as a social construct created by so-
cial norms. As such, even modem notions of disability may be limited in their
ability to capture the full diversity of human beings and their ways of living. Janine
Benedet & Isabel Grant, Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental
Disabilities: Evidentiary and Procedural Issues, 52 McGILL L.J. 515, 517-18 (2007). For a
broader discussion of critical disability theory, see CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ES-
SAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, POLICY AND LAW (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin
eds., 2006). See also Bill Hughes & Kevin Paterson, The Social Model of Disability and
the Disappearing Body: Towards a Sociology of Impairment, 12 DISABILITY & SOC'Y, no. 3,
325 (1997); Liz Crow, Including All of Our Lives: Renewing the Social Model of Disabil-
ity, in JONATHAN RIx, MELANIE NIND, KIERON SHEEHY, KATY SIMMONS & CHRISTOPHER
WALSH, EQUALITY, PARTICIPATION AND INCLUSION 1: DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES, 124
(2010).
24. See generally Zeus Leonardo, The Souls of White Folk: Critical Pedagogy, Whiteness Stud-
ies, and Globalization Discourse, 5 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC., no. 1, 29 (2002); CRITICAL
WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic
eds., 1997).
25. CDA was developed within several disciplines in the humanities and social sci-
ences, such as rhetoric, anthropology, or philosophy. It is sometimes used inter-
changeably with "critical linguistics." Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer, Critical
Discourse Analysis: History, Agenda, Theory and Methodology, in METHODS OF CRITICAL
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 1 (Ruth Wodak & Michael Meyer eds., 2009). CAD is a broadly
interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse that views language as an ele-
ment of social practice. See generally LILIE CHOULIARAKI & NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH,
DISCOURSE IN LATE MODERNITY (2000).
26. Critical rhetoric was coined to describe the two-part task of first analyzing the op-
posing discursive forces of dominating power and next, critiquing liberating power,
or freedom. See Raymie E. McKerrow, Critical Rhetoric: Theory and Praxis, 56 Comm.
MONOGRAPHS 91, 92-93 (1989) (describing domination as the construction of an or-
der by the ruling class, and the imposition of sanctions for dissenters as a means of
establishing bounds accepted by the people in a community).
27. "Critical legal rhetoric" grows out of the broader critical rhetoric approach. The
concept appears to have been introduced by Marouf Hasian, Jr. Hasian describes
critical legal rhetoric as a process of legal analysis that goes beyond looking at pre-
cedent and "black letter" law and being skeptical about scholars' claims about the
nature of law. MAROUF ARIF HASIAN, LEGAL MEMORIES AND AMNESIAS IN AMERICA'S
RHETORICAL CULTURE 2 (2000). See generally Lolita Buckner Inniss, A Critical Legal
Rhetoric Approach to In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 24 ST. JOHN'S
J. L. COMM. 649 (2010).
28. See Patricia Hill Collins, Gender, Black Feminism, and Black Political Economy, 568 AN-
NALS 41, 42 (2000). Intersectionality is a term coined by scholar KimberlI Crenshaw.
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ing used in ways that are not always obvious, as scholars seek new
insights into old problems. For example, some scholars are using CRT to
inform critical disability theory and feminist theory.29
In summary, the critical program comes in a variety of forms. All of
these forms, including CRT, examine social conditions in order to uncover
hidden structures. Perhaps ironically, the critical program in law, and
especially critical race theory, is overwhelmingly normative, seeking not
only to expose the limits of dominant legal theoretical norms but also to
bring about change in those renderings. Like other aspects of the critical
program, CRT takes a skeptical view of truth claims made in traditional
mainstream formulations. This skepticism is, as one scholar observes, es-
sentially an assault on the notion of the particularity of law, and the idea
that law is a "closed" discipline that is autonomous and self-sufficient.30
In this regard, the critical program, and most especially CRT, is as much a
human geographic or spatial construct as it is a historic or social one.
III. HUMAN GEOGRAPHY IN BRIEF
Human geography is a relatively recent branch of the general study of
geography that considers the relationships between human societies and
the built and natural environments in which they are established. Since
all geography is "human" in some sense, being the product of human
endeavor, it requires stating that human geography is not contrary to a
general geography where the human element is somehow excluded.3I
Rather, human geography "suggests a more synthetic knowledge be-
tween the physical laws that govern the earth and the humans that popu-
See Kimberl Crenshaw, Women of Color at the Center: Selections from the Third Na-
tional Conference on Women of Color and the Law: Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241, 1244
(1991). It should be noted however that intersectionality is closely related to the
broader notion of complex inequality propounded by other scholars. See, e.g., Jan
Pakulski, "Complex Inequalities," ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IDENTrrY 119, 1220 (2010). Com-
plex inequality critiques the dominant stratificationist and Marxist accounts of ine-
quality and simple hierarchical accounts. Some recent discussions of
intersectionality have acknowledged the potential spatial aspects. See, e.g., Gill Val-
entine, Theorizing and Researching Intersectionality: A Challenge for Feminist Geography,
59 THE PROF. GEOGRAPHER 10 (2007).
Professor Gowri Ramachandran offers an alternate view of intersectionality, de-
fining the word "intersectional" as a noun meaning "persons who are members of
more than one "low-status" category, such as women of color, queer persons of
color, or indigent women." Gowri Ramachandran, Intersectionality As "Catch 22":
Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither Harmless Nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 299, 301 (2005). She then uses intersectionality to refer to the conflict created
by multiple competing identities. Id. at 303.
29. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections on
Social Justice and Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 391 (2001). Perhaps even more
surprising is the notion of using critical disability theory norms to inform CRT. Ra-
cial and gender differences have more in common with physical disability than
scholars often like to acknowledge. See, e.g., Lolita Buckner Inniss, Critical Condi-
tions: Bridging Critical Race Theory and Critical Disability Theory (working paper) (on
file with author); see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Race as Disability, Presentation at Pace
Law School (Feb. 9, 2009).
30. NICHOLAs K. BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPEIES OF POWER 8 (1994).
31. Paul Vidal de La Blanche, PRINCIPES DE GtOGRAPHIE HumAINE 3 (1921).
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late it."32 Human geography concerns the development of ideas resulting
from geographical knowledge and not the pure material facts of geogra-
phy.33 This often means attention to the location, space and scale of social
phenomena across scholarly diverse subject areas.
Contemporary work in human geography covers a wide array of dis-
ciplines such as sociology, politics, urban studies or anthropology. This is
seen even in the spatial metaphors deployed across disciplines such as
"public" and "private", "high" and "low" culture, "subject position,"
"frontier", "border", the "politics of location", or "standpoint epistemol-
ogy". Moreover, many contemporary accounts in human geography ad-
dress cultural concerns such as identity, language, and custom. Still
others go beyond material concerns and look to theoretical issues.B4 There
is, in addition, a distinct sub-field within human geography called "cul-
tural geography" that addresses cultural products and norms and their
variations within and across spaces and places as well as their relations to
those spaces and places. Within this context there is a distinction to be
made between place and space. "Place" may be understood as spaces
that have been imbued with social or cultural values and distinct identi-
ties. "Space" is more neutral and less value-laden, but both place and
space are part of a larger concept of term spatiality.
As one commentator writes, spatial theories are not limited to explicit,
physical geography but instead move between social theories and other
more abstract theories, and are "implicated in myriad topographies of
power and knowledge."35 However, it is important to note that even
when deployed in metaphoric terms, space is not a pure abstract. Rather,
space is a socially constructed lived form, and "subsumes things pro-
duced and encompasses their interrelationships in their coexistence and
simultaneity."36 Ideologies are often sustained via material manifesta-
tions of space.37 Hence, many accounts of space begin by acknowledging
a dialectical relationship between space and society.38 One frequently
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4.
34. For a discussion of place versus space, see generally FEMINISMS IN GEOGRAPHY: RE-
THINKING SPACE, PLACE, AND KNOWLEDGES (Pamela Moss & Karen Falconer Al-Hindi
eds., 2008); Yi-Fu TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE (2001);
DOREEN V. MASSEY, SPACE, PLACE AND GENDER (1994).
35. DEREK GREGORY, GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATIONS 11 (1994).
36. HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE 73 (1991).
37. Id. at 44 ("What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it
describes, whose vocabulary and kinks it makes use of, and whose code it embod-
ies? . . . What would remain of the Church if there were no churches?").
38. Much of such work builds upon the work of Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre distinguishes
between spatial practice (the ways in which a society deciphers its space in prac-
tice), representations of space (the dominant modality of space in most societies that
arises from planners, and others) and representational spaces (associated images
and symbols that are layered over physical space). Id. at 38-39. There are a number
of scholars whose work follows on Lefebvre. See MANUEL CASTELtS, THE URBAN
QUESTION (1979); DAVID HARVEY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE CITY (1973); ROB SHIELDS,
PLACES ON THE MARGIN (1991). Edward Soja's work has been especially influential
in theorizing the relationship between literal and figurative notions of space. Soja
offered a theory of what he called "thirdspace" that he defined as "an-Other way of
understanding and acting to change the spatiality of human life, a distinct mode of
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cited aspect of the way that human geographers study phenomena is the
exercise of mapping. Via mapping, geographers link place and space,
and it is this focus that often adds a distinct geographical perspective.
Geographic points of view have even been brought to a discipline that
has sometimes been thought of as essentially impervious to such incur-
sions-law.
IV. GEOGRAPHY AND THE LAW
Law has often been thought of as amenable to only to certain types of
outside influences. Socio-legal scholars have long debated the extent to
which law is its own autonomous discipline consisting of internally con-
structed norms, procedures, and justifications or instead a creature of
outside social, political or economic forces. Ultimately, scholars have ac-
knowledged the importance of social and political concerns to the struc-
ture of law. Indeed, it has been said that law and society are mutually
constituting, with law creating society and society creating law.39 There is
also a clear acknowledgement of the role that history plays in shaping
law.40 However, there is a large and growing body of law and geography
scholarship that goes beyond these accepted trans-disciplines with law,
and increasingly scholars have adopted a geographical approach to law. 41
Such spatial theories are, in large part, aimed at broadening the view of
law as a historically instantiated social enterprise. Often the fundamental
questions of legal geography concern themselves with the fact that in law,
as in geography, "space" is sometimes contested, contingent, or other-
wise at issue. In law, as in other disciplines, space has frequently meant
attention to attachments to physical territory, but with added attention to
spatial legal rules that mediate these attachments. Some examples are
zoning and planning laws, the creation of urban or suburban areas, mi-
gration across national or sub-national political borders, or the environ-
ment. In the legal context geography is part of an interdisciplinary
exchange that may involve jurists, politicians, city planners, sociologists
and economists. There is a commensurately large amount of literature on
critical spatial awareness that is appropriate to the new scope and significance being
brought about in the rebalanced trialectics of spatiality-historicality-sociality." ED-
WARD SOJA, THIRDSPACE 10 (1996). For Soja, "thirdspace" was a space wherein
"[e]verything comes together... subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the
concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repeti-
tive and the differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and
the unconscious, the disciplined and the transdisciplinary, everyday life and unend-
ing history." Id. at 56-57.
39. BLOMLEY, supra note 30, at 12 (citing David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 3 STAN. L. REv. 575, 609 (1984)).
40. Id. at 14-18.
41. For a general discussion of legal geography, see generally Steven M. Graves &
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Lending and the Military: The Law and Geography of
"Payday" Loans in Military Towns, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 695 n.268 (2005) (citing
Nicholas K. Blomley & Joel C. Bakan, Spacing Out: Towards a Critical Geography of
Law, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 664 (1992)); Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison, Con-
necting Law and Geography, in LAW & GEOGRAPHY 2 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison
eds., 2002); David Delaney et al., Preface: Where is Law?, in THE LEGAL GEOGRAPIES
READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE xiii (Nicholas K. Blomley et al. eds., 2001).
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these more literal aspects of legal geography. There is, however, a clear
critical trajectory in the works of some legal scholars who utilize spatial
analysis to expose the ideological structures and distributive effects of
legal rules related to material spaces.42 Relatively few scholars interrogate
the deeper meanings of the legal geographical entities or consider the fig-
urative dimensions of legal geography and the way in which it shapes
socio-legal formations in legal or quasi-legal regimes.
In the exploration of the link between law, space and society, many
complexities are best addressed by accounts that understand "space" as
both material and metaphoric. Such methods look beyond the material
aspects of the way in which physical space impacts law. 43 For the last few
decades, there has been a flourishing of research dedicated to the more
abstract interplay between law and space.44 Some of these works examine
governance and social justice issues with regard to relationships of
power, inclusion and exclusion, citizenship, and rights and freedoms,
among other things.45 This is seen, for instance, in a discussion of ostensi-
bly rational and objective transit planning processes that provide the
same (or more) public transit service for the rich as for the poor, hence
42. See, e.g., Mark Kessler, Free Speech Doctrine in American Political Culture: A Critical
Legal Geography of Cultural Politics, 6 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 205, 208 (2007)
("[Ilncreasingly, scholars of culture focus on the geographic dimensions of cultural
representations. Influenced by Foucault and work in human geography, this work
examines the historical processes producing spatial representations of social and
political life and assesses the political implications of such geographical symbol-
ism."). See also Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries Of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1843, 1863 (1994) (discussing a hybrid of three
disciplinary regimes, legal political geography, which is described as consisting of
"three primary elements: first, the jurisdictional boundaries that define a govern-
ment or entity; second, the power and/or rights of the entity vis-A-vis land and
individuals within its boundaries; and third, the system of internal governance or
administration of the government or entity.").
43. See, e.g., EDWARD SOJA, POSTMODERN GEOGRAPHIcs 25 (1989) (describing how space
can obscure structures and consequences from us, and "how relationships of power
and discipline are inscribed into the apparently innocent spatiality of social life,
how human geographies are filled with power and ideology."). See also Ron Levi,
Gated Communities in Law's Gaze: Material Forms and the Production of a Social Body in
Legal Adjudication, 4 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 635, 637 (2009) ("[Clourts are resisting
their spatial claims and that in their place courts are articulating a social imaginary
in which the geographic landscape flows uninterrupted by the exclusionary pres-
ence of gates.").
44. Other scholars have discussed the extent to which the law in general makes spatial
claims and the specifics of law's geography in Foucauldian spatial terms. See, e.g.,
Russell Hogg, Law's Other Spaces, 6 LTC 29, 33-34 (2002) ("Courtrooms are perhaps
an obvious and important example of a 'heterotopia': places that are in a sense,
'outside of all places' and yet in which all other socially 'real' sites are represented,
they help foster the illusion of law's spatial neutrality and universality, its very
placelessness. To be sure, certain effects (including spatial effects), of legitimation
and social control, are produced by and from within these legal places, but it is
important to remember that these are nevertheless limited, particular and
contingent.").
45. See, e.g., EDWARD SOJA, SEEKING SPATIAL JUSTICE XV (2010) (suggesting that under-
standing interactions between space and societies is essential to exposing and ad-
dressing social injustices and to reflecting on planning policies that aims at reducing
them).
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framing transit equity territorially without considering the uneven transit
needs of people in various neighborhood.46 Such examinations are aimed
at exploring the influence of legal rules on the construction of material,
social and mental spaces, exposing the impact that these spaces have on
the creation and interpretation of legal principles and doctrines, and the
political implications of such interpretations.47 Some of the work of Fou-
cault is especially useful for understanding the way in which "political
geographies" are constructed.48
V. THE GEOGRAPHIES OF LAW, FOUCAULT, AND "OTHER SPACES"
Several key figures have theorized about some of the more abstract,
ideological aspects of space.49 Noteworthy among these theorists is
Michel Foucault, who described how space reflects power structures in
societies and states. Across numerous works, Foucault evidences a preoc-
cupation with "space" in both abstract and material senses. Foucault
suggests that a key to power is space.50 Law, as an instrument of power,
resistance or change, is constitutive of social and relational identities.
Partly as a result of the way in which law shapes identities, legal dis-
course has a tendency to characterize, specify, differentiate, or particular-
ize definitions of applicable fields of juridical norms. These delimiters
have led to the development of an abstract geography of law that aids in
building a link between the analysis of representations of cultural models
and the action of interrogating the relationship between space and the
production of the social link. It is this social geographical link that Fou-
cault addresses.
46. Id. at xii-iv.
47. See, e.g., Alexandre Kedar, On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes
Towards a Research Agenda, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 401 (2003). Kedar explains the
way in which legal systems, particularly the Supreme Court, play a crucial role in
maintaining "geographies of power" by empowering the state in its land disputes
cases. See also Geremy Forman, A Tale of Two Regions: Diffusion of the Israeli '50 Per-
cent Rule' from the Galilee to the Occupied West Bank, 34 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 671
(2009) (discussing the way in which the movement of law between the local, re-
gional, and national levels of the legal system also facilitates the movement of law
from place to place).
48. BLOMLEY, supra note 30, at 43. Blomley writes that Foucault's account of power "es-
chews a Leviathan-like top-down account of sovereignty for a profoundly localized
account of the capillary and relational aspects of power as a strategic relation." Id.
49. See, e.g., Henri Lefebvre, Reflections on the Politics of Space, 8 ANTIPODE 30, 31 (1979)
("Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always
been political and strategic. [... JSpace has been shaped and molded from historical
and natural elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and
ideological. It is a product literally filled with ideologies.").
50. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Questions on Geography, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977, 63 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et
al. trans., 1980); Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED
INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 149 ("A whole history remains to be
written of spaces--which would at the same time be the history of powers... from
the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional ar-
chitecture from the classroom to the design of hospitals, passing via economic and
political installations. [.. . Anchorage in a space is an economico-political form
which needs to be studied in detail.").
78 E HARVARD JRNL ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE U VOL. 28, 2012
In his essay "Des Espaces Autres" (Other Spaces), Foucault offers a
diagram of space that merges the material and metaphoric. In this work
Foucault indicates that society is comprised of three distinct spaces: the
real world, utopia, and heterotopia.51 These spaces exist in a particular-
ized relation to each other and to the social structures of power.52 The
first such space, real space, typically describes the world that most of us
inhabit, the normative, day-to-day life. The second space, utopia, is an
idealized site which exists in no actual place though it may be assigned to
an actual place. In utopia, society is presented in a perfected form, or, in
an entirely imperfect, dystopic form, but in either case, according to Fou-
cault, what occurs in utopia is unreal. Utopias are crafted in order to
model the way in which we ought (or ought not) to live and think when
in real spaces, and are maintained by real space elites. Examples of uto-
pias are expressions of religious or moral belief systems. Perhaps modem
examples of utopia are the carefully constructed virtual worlds that in-
habit cyberspace such as fantasy sports leagues and the virtual reality
game Second Life.53 Finally, there is heterotopia, as space where all other
real spaces are simultaneously represented, contested and inverted.
54
Heterotopias exist in most cultures and societies as counter-sites to real
spaces and utopias, and their explicit role is to contest and to question the
other spaces. Heterotopias are in many ways the most diffuse of Fou-
cault's spatial geography.
Because of their role in contesting other spaces, some scholars have
construed heterotopias as being strictly liminal in nature with no actual
attributes of their own.5 5 While this is often true, heterotopias are, first
and foremost, sources of alternate interpretations and visions of real life.
This means that they sometimes provide permanent refuge for outsiders.
At other times heterotopias help their outsider or insider inhabitants to
refresh their spirits or to reconcile differences so that they may rejoin the
real world and properly value utopian ideals. Examples of modern heter-
51. Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 16 DIACRITICS 22, 24 (Jay Miskowiec trans., 1986).
For a general discussion of Foucault's concept of heterotopia, see Bruno Genocchi,
Discourse, Discontinuity, Difference: The Question Of "Other" Spaces, in PosTMODERN
CITIES AND SPACES 37 (Sophie Watson & Katherine Gibson eds., 1995) ("... Fou-
cault's discussion of heterotopia centres upon a discursive/linguistic site in contrast
to... an examination of actual... locations [in Of Other Spaces] ... In each case the
distinguishing feature of the heterotopia is [that it enables].. .a form of [discontinu-
ity] ... a status which, in turn, gives each the ability to transgress, undermine and
question the alleged coherence or totality of self-contained orders and systems.").
For another discussion of heterotopia, see Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace and Space, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 210 (2007).
52. See Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 24.
53. Perhaps modem examples of utopia are the carefully constructed virtual worlds
that inhabit cyberspace such as fantasy sports leagues and the virtual reality game
Second Life. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017,
1018-21 (2009) (arguing that despite the premise of irreality in such games, there is
a clear hierarchy evident wherein creators of the games are self-designated "gods"
who maintain control over virtual environments and virtual inhabitants).
54. See Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 24.
55. Cohen, supra note 51, at 215 (citing KEviN HETHERINGTON, THE BADLANDS OF MODER-
NITY: HETEROTOPIA AND SOCIAL ORDERING 20-38 (1997)); ROB SHIELDS, PLACES ON THE
MARGIN: ALTERNATIVE GEOGRAPHIES OF MODERNITY 260-65 (1991).
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otopias are diffuse and many: mental hospitals, prisons, museums and
vacation homes are just a few. Foucault, while positing many varied
forms of heterotopias, suggests that they exist in two general forms.56
The first type of heterotopia is the crisis heterotopia. These are places
that are "privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individu-
als who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which
they live, in a state of crisis." s7 Foucault offers places of refuge for adoles-
cents or the elderly, such as boarding schools or nursing homes.58 It may
be asserted that universities themselves, and perhaps most particularly
law schools, are of the crisis heterotopia variety, serving as they do as
places where mostly young adults go to both mature and gain advanced
knowledge.9 Universities, like other crisis heterotopias, exert a type of
vigilance over potentially anti-hegemonic, liminal forces by shaping and
guiding study into specific streams. While universities are sources for
promoting upward mobility and class change, they are also mechanisms
for re-inscribing existing class norms. It is perhaps no accident that many
of the less "elite" educational institutions often define their missions as
inculcating practical training for careers, and providing opportunities for
non-traditional students or serving regional needs, whereas more "elite"
institutions frequently offer liberal arts or scientific education suited to no
career in particular.60 In much the same way, many elite law schools,
while offering both classical legal education and less-traditional fare,
rarely directly address the need for specific vocational training. In con-
trast, some less-elite law schools have a heavy focus on bar preparation,
"skills-training" or clinical work for students. Accordingly, within the
legal academy, elite schools become themselves discrete spaces (one
might posit them as utopias) within the heterotopia that is legal educa-
tion. Following on this, within specific law schools themselves, courses
outside of the core curriculum are themselves discrete spaces. One might
describe certain of these courses as crisis heterotopias.
Foucault notes that heterotopias of crisis are fast disappearing and
that they are being replaced by what he calls "heterotopias of devia-
tion."61 These are places where individuals whose behavior is deviant in
relation to the required mean or norm are located.62 Even places such as
vacation spots may be characterized as heterotopias of deviance. Though
engaging in leisure is a well-founded and accepted part of real-world be-
havior, existing in a state of regularized, long-term idleness may be con-
sidered deviant given the continued ideological if not material adherence
56. See Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 24.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Erik Blair, A Further Education College as Heterotopia, 14 RES. iN POST-COMPULSORY
EDUC. 93 (2009) (focusing on advanced educational attainment such as at graduate
school).
60. See TERRY CAESAR, TRAVELING THROUGH THE BoONDocKS: IN AND OUT OF ACADEMIC
HIERARCHY 24-26 (2000). See also Terry Caesar, On Teaching at a Second-Rate Univer-
sity, 90 S. ATLANIc Q. 449 (1991).
61. Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 25.
62. Id.
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to the Protestant work ethic in the United States.63 The Protestant work
ethic influenced large numbers of people to engage in work in the secular
world, developing their own business enterprises and engaging in trade
and the accumulation of for investment. Moreover, the Protestant work
ethic views constant work as being both the norm and normative. Some
places, as Foucault notes, have attributes of both crisis and deviation,
such as nursing homes or prisons. In this regard, one might equally as
well argue that universities are heterotopias of both crisis and deviation,
since being an unlearned youth (or existing in a state of being of so untu-
tored as to make one akin to a youth) is both a crisis and a deviation from
proliferating norms that establish a college education as a marker of mid-
dle class success.
Foucault further suggests that there is a fourth space that fuses the
norms of utopian, real and heterotopian spaces, which he calls the mir-
ror.64 The mirror is the portal, a placeless place, an intermediate space
that gives evidence of various versions of the real world depending on
what is placed before it (real world or heterotopia) and of what seemingly
lies within the mirror, beyond the immediate reflection (the utopia).65 All
of Foucault's spaces can be posited in legal pedagogy.
VI. SPATIALITY IN THE LAW SCHOOL AND THE ROLE OF CRT
Within the field of education there are clear themes and concepts con-
cerning the production, maintenance, consumption and governance of
educational spaces at different scales and in different cultural contexts.
As a result, there have been a number of writings that address the ways
in which space has been instantiated in educational life, and especially
the differentiating effects of unequal educational provision.66 Such work
often addresses the extent to which the spatiality of the academy and ed-
ucational institutions both produce and reproduce social hierarchy.67
There is also literature concerning the spatial nature of educational policy
changes concerning identity and race. 68 Space has been offered as a basis
63. Id. For a discussion of the nature of the Protestant work ethic, see MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT WORK ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1904), in which Weber de-
scribes how capitalism evolved when the Protestant ethic (specifically Calvinist-in-
fluenced) spurred the growth of rational capitalism, which then helped to create the
industrial revolution and the spread of capitalism as the preeminent universal eco-
nomic system.
64. Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 24.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Kalervo N. Gulson & Colin Symes, Knowing One's Place: Educational Theory,
Policy and the Spatial Turn, in SPATIAL THEORIES OF EDUCATION, POLICY AND GEOGRA-
PHY 1 (Kalervo N. Gulson & Colin Symes eds., 2007).
67. See, e.g., Karen M. Morin & Tamar Y. Rothenberg, Our Theories, Ourselves: Hierarchies
of Place and Status in the U.S. Academy, 10 ACME: AN INT'L E-JOURNAL FOR CRITICAL
GEOGRAPHIES 58,59 (2011) (considering the reputational hierarchies of higher educa-
tion, and those hierarchies' "tendency to reproduce deeply problematic elitisms and
to reinforce damaging cultural politics of academic knowledge production and
practices that go along with them").
68. See KALERVO N. GULSON, EDUCATION POLICY, SPACE AND THE CITY: MARKETS AND THE
(IN)vISMItTY OF RACE (2010); SPATIAL THEORIES OF EDUCATION: POLICY AND GEOGRA-
PHY MATTERS, supra note 66.
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for discussions of curriculum69 and critical pedagogy.0 There are numer-
ous different sites of education and learning which are accessed at differ-
ent stages of life.71 Even within the various contexts and scales of
education, there are, permeating each one, socio-spatial concerns. As one
scholar has noted, spatialized social status arrangements are not only
common to most academic structures, but necessary for such structures to
exist.72 This is in large measure related to the way in which schools exer-
cise a clear role in shaping society. Foucault, in writing generally of the
disciplinary nature of certain societal institutions, described school as a
"pedagogical machine," that is framed to train students for "individuali-
zation" and subordination.3 Law schools, it has been suggested, are par-
ticular sites of spatial production of social norms.74
Much attention has been given to scholarly discussion of hierarchy
and identity in the context of law schools. Previous research in this field
has often focused on classroom method, substantive law and "legal rea-
soning." Some studies have focused on the effects that legal training has
on the way that students think.75 Other work has addressed the way that
69. Jan Nespor, Undergraduate Curricula as Networks and Trajectories, in RICHARD ED-
WARDS & ROBIN USHER, SPACE, CURRICULUM AND LEARNING 93 (2000). Nespor writes
that curricula "organize educational landscape." Id. at 98. The meaning of instruc-
tional events cannot be inferred simply from the course artifacts or the instructors
stated intentions. Rather, "the spatial networks that contextualize such artifacts,
actors, and events constitute them, and they emerge over variable but sometimes
extended periods of time." Id. at 104.
70. See, e.g., PEDAGOGY OF PLACE: SEEING SPACE AS CULTURAL EDUCATION 15-16 (David
M. Callejo Perez et al. eds., 2004).
71. See, e.g., John Morgan, Critical Pedagogy: The Spaces that Make the Difference, 8
PEDAGOGY, CULTURE AND SOC. 273, 276 (2000).
72. TERRY CAESAR, TRAVELING THROUGH THE BOONDOCKS: IN AND OUT OF ACADEMIC HI-
ERARCHY, supra note 60, at 2. In his analysis of the hierarchical American academic
system, Caesar refers to the decision to work at a particular school as locating ambi-
tion. He suggests that this locating of ambition is both a physical-spatial process
and a reputational-relational process.
73. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 172 (1977).
74. See, e.g., Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Educa-
tion in A Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VANDERBILT L. REV. 515, 525 (2007)
(using the term "matrix" to describe "the complex web of rituals, habits, and
shared assumptions that create a culture of legal education resistant to change.").
They point to the multiple meanings of matrix, noting that "these meanings fit
under the larger idea of looking at parts of a whole, of examining the spaces be-
tween things and not just the things themselves; of seeing things as they are arrayed
in more than one dimension; of looking at the larger environment through smaller
samples." Id. See also WENDY LEO MOORE, REPRODUCING RACISM: WHITE SPACE,
ELITE LAW SCHOOLS, AND RACIAL INEQUALITY 174 (2008) (arguing that law schools
are "totalizing invocations of white space" wherein the concerns of students of
color are marginalized as ethical, non-neutral, and ultimately non-legal concerns).
See also DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERAR-
CHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM, A CRITICAL EDITION 88 (2004) (describing the
micro-society of American law schools and arguing that the micro-society's patterns
of hierarchy reproduce, and thus reinforce, similarly structured patterns of hierar-
chy in other social "cells"). See also Sarah Buhler, Journeys to 20th Street: the Inner
City as Critical Pedagogical Space for Legal Education, 32 DALHOUSIE L. J. 381 (2009).
75. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997).
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law schools shape goals and ideals of students.76 Still others have argued
that even ostensibly informal spaces in law schools are sites of hierar-
chy.77 Implicitly or explicitly, the law school experience derives from spa-
tial norms. The crucial earning spaces of legal education are, despite the
march of modernity and constant mediation for change, essentially closed
structures. For instance, although numerous pedagogical models are em-
ployed in law schools today, the administrative structure of law schools
and some of the core curriculum offered in many law schools are based
on the policies that Christopher Columbus Langdell developed over a
hundred years ago. 78 The Socratic,79 "Professor Kingsfield"80 style of
pedagogy that requires students to "perform" legal preparedness inside
the traditional law school classroom is still coin of the realm in teaching
methodology.81
The traditional legal method may even in some respects be posited as
a Foucauldian utopia, given the norms that require suspension of "real
life" concerns and intuitionS2 and the invocation of the "artificial reason-
ing" of the law.s3 Such reasoning, delivered via traditional methodolo-
76. See, e.g., Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, The Fate of Elite Idealism: Accommodation
and Ideological Work at Harvard Law School, in Soc. PROBS. 315, 316, 320 (1992)
(describing the way that elite professional schools effectively shape students' career
desires and expectations).
77. See, e.g., Desmond Manderson & Sarah Turner, Coffee House: Habitus and Performance
Among Law Students, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 649 (2006); Nicholas K. Blomley, From
"What" to "So What": Law and Geography in Retrospect, in LAW AND GEOGRAPHY 17
(Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003).
78. See BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, C.C.
LANGDELL 1826-1906 (2009). As a leading figure in legal education, Langdell insti-
tuted the case method of instruction, and the curriculum he developed for first year
students-torts, contracts, property, criminal law, and civil procedure-is still
largely the standard in most United States law schools. Id. at 7-9, 130-132. Lang-
dell's administrative policies were based on what he believed to be ideals of merit,
and in pursuit of this he instituted a career track for law school faculty, required a
bachelor's degree for admission to law school, created a three-year curriculum, and
instituted required examinations for students. Id. at 219-21.
79. This method is also known as catechetical, eristic, or just "question and answer."
See MILNER S. BALL, CALLED By STORIES: BIBLICAL SAGAS AND THEIR CHALLENGE FOR
LAW 59 (2000).
80. Professor Kingsfield is a character from the film THE PAPER CHASE. THE PAPER
CHASE (20th Century Fox 1973). With his white hair, bow ties, patrician accent and
weapon-like use of the Socratic method in his legal classroom, he is an icon in legal
lore. See generally Martha Chamallas, The Shadow of Professor Kingsfield: Contemporary
Dilemmas Facing Women Law Professors, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 198
(2005); David Ray Papke, Crusading Hero, Devoted Teacher, and Sympathetic Failure:
The Self-Image of the Law Professor in Hollywood Cinema and in Real Life, Too, 28 VT. L.
REv. 957, 966-67 (2004).
81. See Elizabeth Mertz, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A
LAWYER" 26 (2007) (".... .[Clommentators continue to speak of 'Socratic Teaching' as
the signal approach to law school pedagogy.").
82. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 74, at 521-22 (claiming that the law school experience
"is intentionally destabilizing: it invites students to suspend judgment, to question
their intuitions, to read structurally, to learn a new language, and to ask different
questions").
83. The phrase "artificial reasoning" is meant to evoke Sir Edward Coke's assertion that
the common law represented "an artificial perfection of reason". ALLEN D. BOYER,
SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN AGE 83 (2003). Artificial reason is not nat-
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gies may make the law school experience terroristic and infantilizing at
the same time for many students.84 The CRT classroom is often repre-
sented as an oasis within or respite from the traditional law school
classroom.
CRT classes are often conceived of as "safe spaces" for students of
color or other socially-subordinated groups in the legal academy, places
where such students can take refuge from the cool rationalism, empiri-
cism, and universalism on display in many standard law school courses.85
In CRT courses, students can offer counter-discourses to challenge main-
stream classroom dogma, giving voice to their anxious, race-lensed and
sometimes emotion-laden analyses that all too often are devalued in the
mainstream legal classroom. In such classes some students lament, for
example, that their experiences as "summers" at "Big Law"86 firms are
sometimes disappointing and frequently characterized by social and pro-
fessional exclusion. Big Law" is a popular designation for large, main-
stream law firms. Such firms frequently have summer employment
programs for law students that are explicitly designated as the route to
full time, post law school employment. Black lawyers often face particu-
lar difficulties in these elite firms.87
It is important to note that the "safe space" phenomenon of the CRT
classroom relates not just to students of color and/or to progressive stu-
ural reason or native intelligence, but rather skill is to be acquired by those steeped
in lawyerly conventions. Id. at 84. See also Steven D. Smith, Believing Like A Lawyer,
40 B. C. L. REV. 1041, 1051 (1999) (citing Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law
or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REV. 35 (1981)).
84. See Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 230, 237 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) ("Even liberalized contem-
porary versions of this pedagogy remain at best passive and at worst infantiliz-
ing."). The traditional law school teaching methods have been subject to numerous
critiques, among them that such teaching fails to impart moral values or imparts the
wrong moral values, causes unnecessary and damaging stress, and favors white
male students. Id. at 237. It has, nonetheless, "outlasted its theoretical rationale."
MERTZ, supra note 81, at 264. For further discussion of the way in which the use of
the Socratic method may disadvantage some students, see GUINIER ET AL., supra note
75; Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. OF LEGAL EDuc. 137
(1988).
85. There is a growing scholarship discussing, for example, the fact the women and
persons with working or lower-class backgrounds may feel alienated by the tradi-
tional law school experience. See e.g., Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal
Education: How Law Schools Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BuFF.
L. REV. 1155 (2008). One scholar has suggested that the interests of nontraditional
law students-such as returning students, women, or students of color-are being
sacrificed to interests of mainstream students in legal education. Rhonda V. Magee,
Legal Education and the Formation of Professional Identity: A Critical Spirituo-Humanistic
- 'Humanity Consciousness' - Perspective, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 467
(2007).
86. For a discussion of the role of Big Law firms in shaping the law school experience
and subsequent employment, see Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for
Elite Law Firm Associates, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909 (2004).
87. This is perhaps most emblematic of the difficulties facing blacks in elite firms. For
discussion of the relative paucity of black lawyers in elite law firms, see David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law
Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV 493 (1996).
84 E HARVARD JRNL ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUSTICE U VOL. 28, 2012
dents. Indeed, students of various races and of varying ideologies are
increasingly present in the CRT classroom. This is crucial, because CRT
courses are most vital when there is philosophical and social diversity
exists. Discussions that query the merits of CRT may add to what one
scholar has described as "strong democratic talk:"88 conversations that
guide us "to discover[ing] common bonds, moving beyond merely creat-
ing shared understandings."89 In promoting such talk there is, not
surprisingly perhaps, often a goal of mutually reformulating understand-
ings.90 However, the possibility of such democratic talk and any resultant
mutual reformulation of ideas depends heavily on the clear articulation of
rational, ethical, principled points of view. One growing and important
dynamic of CRT classrooms, especially as some United States law schools
grow whiter after a period of growing racial integration,91 is that more
and more students are there to question what they see as an undue focus
on racially related topics and proliferating norms of "political correct-
ness". Such norms, assert some students, require them to understand ra-
cism as a contemporary problem to be reckoned with in law and society.92
These students may sometimes offer counter-testimony that in substance
denies the impact of racism. It is, nonetheless, important to allow for the
testimony on all points of view in the CRT classroom.
While testimony and sharing are still important aspects of CRT
courses, the focus on such courses as safe spaces within the law school
may obscure their broader function, and may even harm course partici-
pants. The tradition of multicultural and anti-racist teaching that occurs
in many Western classroom settings is not sui generis. Instead, it locates
from and is embedded in mainstream cultural narratives of history, gene-
88. John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial Kind: Pedagogical Reflections and Semi-
nar Conversations, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 905-06 (1997) (citing BENJAMIN R. BARBER,
STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 178, 185-186 (1984)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. After first achieving gains under affirmative action policies developed beginning in
the 1970's, students of color have made up of fewer and fewer United States law
students over the past several years. This is often as a result of changes in the way
that affirmative actions norms have been deployed. The absence of students of
color may change law school classroom dynamics greatly. ANDREA GUERERO, SI-
LENCE AT BOALT HALL: THE DISMANTLING OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 163-165 (2002).
Students of color are all too often the minority even in CRT classrooms. See e.g.,
Judith A.M. Scully, Seeing Color, Seeing Whiteness, Making Change: One Woman's jour-
ney in Teaching Race and American Law, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 59 (2007).
92. For instance, one scholar writes of having taught a course on race and the constitu-
tion in which one white student critiqued the professor's historical examination of
slavery. The student wrote:
[I] would like for this course to be a short history lesson and then get on to
issues that are facing us today. I think that slavery was an atrocity that should
not be repeated and I agree that we must know the past to understand the
present and protect the future, however, I have had this history in high school
classes, undergraduate history, Legal Process 1, and I understand that it will be
covered extensively in Constitutional Law, so I am getting somewhat bored.
Francis Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education, 79 CAUF. L. REV.
1512, 1563 (1991).
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alogy, and "roots". 93 Such accounts may hinder rather than facilitate the
social inclusion of racial, religious or ethnic outsiders. This is because
human emotions work by binding certain types of subjects together, re-
gardless of the overall extent of their similarity. This process creates a
"slide of metonymy" in which, for instance, Islam is equated with "inter-
national terrorist" or immigrant is equated with "bogus asylum
seeker."94 In like fashion, the "differentness" that is emphasized in CRT
may itself become a rather dubious and singular end, rather than one of
many means to achieve a larger scholarly or pedagogical goal. In order to
more fully appreciate the potential of CRT courses, and of the discipline
itself, it is useful to consider CRT pedagogy in light of human geography
norms, and especially in light of the work of philosopher and social theo-
rist Michel Foucault's essay "Des Espaces Autres" ("Of Other Spaces").95
VII. CRT AS OTHER SPACE IN THE LAW SCHOOL
Before looking at the world within the law school, it is perhaps worth
briefly mentioning the Foucauldian spatial relationship between law
school and the rest of the society. In so doing, one would likely have to
assign the law school to a role outside of the real world, and that role
would be either heterotopia or utopia, depending on one's notion of the
law school. Foucault accounts for the possibility that within a heterotopia
there may be several sub-sites or microcosms, and these may or may not
be compatible with each other.96 One might therefore envision an endless
"matrioshka effect," or mise-en-abime of social strata, with each world be-
ing comprised of endless other worlds.97 Hence, a heterotopia (or utopia)
such as the law school may be constituted by its own real spaces, utopias
and heterotopias. Applying Foucault's ideas to the world within the law
school, traditional courses are at times real spaces and at other times uto-
pias, offering hypotheticals and counter-hypotheticals, legal reasoning
and rules of law, all with the goal of helping students to learn to "think
like lawyers." In this context, it may be argued that courses such as CRT,
as they were originally designed, existed as a particular type of heter-
otopian space, intended as spaces for Outsiders and Outsider ideas.
93. Heather Piper & Dean Garratt, Identity and Citizenship: Some Contradictions in Prac-
tice, 52 BRISH JOURNAL OF EDUCATIONAL STUDIES 276, 278-279 (Sep. 2004).
94. Id.
95. Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51.
96. Foucault, Of Other Spaces, supra note 51, at 25-26.
97. A matrioshka is a Russian doll wherein one doll rests inside another, inside another.
The term "matrioshka effect" has been used to describe this "world within a
world" phenomenon. See e.g., Dominique Turpin, La Constitutionnalisation Du Droit
et de la Justice, 42 CAHIERS DE DROIT 619, 625 (2001) (author discusses the "matri-
oshka effect" of certain French constitutional provisions that are replicated in vari-
ous sub-provisions of the French Constitution). Mise-en-abtme occurs when there is
a duplication of images or concepts referring to the structural whole in smaller parts
of the whole. See e.g., Lucien Dallenbach, THE MIRROR IN THE TEXT 7-8, 12-13 (1989)
(discussing the literary and artistic literary device of mise-en-abfme and describing it
as the use of an element within a work which mirrors the work as a whole, such as
reproductions of the entire image of a heraldic shield within smaller frames of the
shield or the "play within a play" in Hamlet).
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However, while CRT courses may contest what goes on in the real
space or the utopia of the main classroom or in the wider real world, the
CRT heterotopia may in many cases be a means of legitimizing the ho-
mogenizing norms of the mainstream classroom, whether those norms
are legal, social, racial or pedagogical. Indeed, one scholar has suggested
that heterotopian spaces may themselves be sources of utopian striv-
ings.98 Regardless of the particular form of the CRT heterotopia, a more
meaningful goal of CRT courses is to become Foucault's mirror, the unify-
ing space in the law school experience. This would mean, for example,
that when students read Johnson v. M'Intosh99 in property and learn about
"Indian Title", if CRT norms were included, all beginning property stu-
dents would also more closely reflect on the ways in which the outcome
in that case is indicative of the social, political, and above all, racial norms
that existed when the case was decided.
While the inclusion of CRT into the broader law school curriculum
seems an attainable goal, there are some clear obstacles to such inclusion.
One obstacle is the resistance of mainstream educators who may view its
inclusion as a corruption of traditional law school dogma. There is a sub-
stantial and well-known literature that considers the extent to which CRT,
especially its methodology of storytelling, is not viewed as a well-
grounded form of scholarly endeavor.100 There are, however, other possi-
ble sites of resistance to the broader adoption of CRT into the law school
curriculum that are less obvious but potentially more significant sources
98. Cohen, supra note 51 (citing KEvIN HETHERINGTON, THE BADLANDS OF MODERNITY:
HETEROTOPIA AND SOCIAL ORDERING 20-38 (1997)).
99. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). Johnson v. M'Intosh was a case in which competing parties
claimed the same land. One party obtained the land directly from conquered Na-
tive Americans. The Supreme Court held that the party taking from the conquered
tribe had only limited "Indian Title" which was inferior to the title held by the
competing party. In our seminar we read the case, the second time for most stu-
dents, as it is a staple of first year Property classes. We spent much time assessing
the Court's finding that the Aboriginal people in question used the land "differ-
ently" than Europeans and did not make "full" claims to land as did Europeans
under Western legal systems. That difference was everything--Aboriginal land use,
because it was shared and or transitory, could not be viewed as encompassing the
same rights as common law land ownership. Some students remarked on the fact
that when they had read the case as first year students, their professors had stu-
diously avoided a discussion of race and the role that it played in the outcome. This
despite assertions by the Court that the Aboriginals in Johnson v. M'Intosh were "in
a state of nature," "savages," and had never been "admitted to the great society of
nations." Id. at 567. For a full discussion of the Native American claims in Johnson
v. M'lntosh and the nature of those claims, see Lolita Buckner Inniss, Toward a Sui
Generis View of Black Rights in Canada? Overcoming the Difference Denial Model of
Countering Anti-Black Racism, 9 BERKELEY J. AiR.Am. L. & POL'Y 32 (2007).
100. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807, 808 (1993) (considering the "appropriate role"
of the narrative form in legal scholarship); Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A
Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CALIF. L. REv. 889, 940-941 (1992) (concern-
ing the need to develop a theory for evaluating works that feature norms and meth-
odologies different from those of the evaluator, the paradigmatic situation being
one where the evaluator accepts the norms and methodology of standard legal
scholarship, but the work being evaluated begins from different ones, such as criti-
cal legal studies, feminist theory, or critical race theory).
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of opposition. One is the opposition of ostensibly progressive educators
who may fear that broader incorporation of CRT norms in the law school
curriculum threatens the carefully crafted, race-neutral scholarly pro-
gramming within law schools. For such persons, including "the racial
view" in courses that are not specifically about race seemingly requires
them to acknowledge the import of matters whose existence they have
very carefully sought to avoid.01
VIII. INCORPORATING CRT INTO MAINSTREAM LEGAL PEDAGOGY
Foucault suggests that heterotopias, by their nature, presuppose a sys-
tem of opening and closing that both isolates them and makes them pene-
trable.102 However, he notes, for the most part a heterotopic site is not
freely accessible like a public place.103 Entry to such places may be com-
pulsory, as would be the case in a prison or mental institution wherein
there is forcible commitment. Entry to certain types of heterotopias may
also be gained through submission to "rites and purifications".104 To
enter these sites one must have "a certain permission and make certain
gestures."105 The job of insightful CRT scholars is to make such permis-
sions possible, bringing CRT to both the real space and the utopia of legal
pedagogy. CRT is a discipline that gained recognition, in significant part,
because it dared to take on privilege in all of its forms. CRT insiders
should look from the inside out, embracing an ethic of inclusion that dis-
mantles privilege in all of its forms. This means opening the door to
scholars dwelling in disciplinary heterotopias, as well as incorporating
CRT norms in the law school curriculum and in the wider academy.
Non-CRT scholars who inhabit the real space and utopia of the law school
must, for their part, also help to re-map established legal pedagogical
geographies.
The irony of the continued separation of courses like CRT from the
mainstream law school canon is that many CRT students entering law
schools have often done so in order effectuate change in mainstream soci-
ety. Such students understand, or come to quickly understand, that
choosing law as the vehicle for change is necessarily fraught with ideo-
101. This is not to suggest that that all progressive professors who choose not to teach
classes on race or who oppose incorporating such topics into mainstream legal dis-
ciplines do so for unprincipled reasons. There is such a thing as simple lack of
interest. Moreover, while scholars of color (or any scholars) have a right to under-
take CRT as their principal area of endeavor, this does not mean that they have a
duty to do so. This raises the notion posited by Professor Kenjii Yoshino of "reverse
covering", performing ones identity in a way that is stereotypical in response to
social pressures. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 906 (2002). Some
scholars have avoided being the "race person" on a faculty where that status is
marginalized. This is especially true for newer scholars of color. One scholar, for
instance, has written of wondering whether choosing to teach a race class might be
tantamount to "racial suicide." Judith A.M. Scully, Seeing Color, Seeing Whiteness,
Making Change: One Woman's Journey in Teaching Race and American Law, 39 U. TOL. L.
REv. 59, 62 (2007).
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logical contradictions.106 These students further understand that resolv-
ing such contradictions will not be an easy task. Hence, these students
are primed for exposure to the plural norms that may be required to rec-
oncile divergent ideologies. Having courses explicitly designated as CRT
in the law school curriculum is one tool for accomplishing this task.
However, though such courses are more frequently present at law schools
in recent years, the norms of CRT, when segregated from the mainstream
curriculum, reach relatively few students.107 This is an era when the dis-
course of racial inclusion in higher education has been not so subtly al-
tered to focus on the benefits of such inclusion to white mainstream
students and not for the racial minority students who seek inclusion.108
But, as one scholar has suggested, even given a climate in which diversity
is promoted as a mainstream virtue in law schools, the question still
arises: are law schools "working diversity?109 Are they, in other words,
"using the diversity in their student body to actually break down racial
stereotypes and promote cross-racial understanding, thereby improving
the law school environment for all of their students?" u 0
To take racial inclusion and the norms of CRT seriously, law schools
must work to incorporate such norms throughout the curriculum in order
to eliminate racial barriers to understanding.", This inclusion could be
achieved in various forms. Scholars working within the discipline must
work to foster this opening of curricular doors and the opening of doors
to CRT. Opening the doors may help to prevent CRT from becoming so
yet another "empire" of the law,112 thus undermining undermine the le-
gal pedagogical program.
106. Margaret Russell, Entering Great America: Reflections on Race and the Convergence of
Progressive Legal Theory and Practice, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 749-50 (1992).
107. Francisco Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal Education - A Cur-
ricular Study with LatCritical Commentary, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 119, 137 (2002); see also
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning Law Through The Lens of Race, 21 J.L. & POL. 1, 2 n.5
(2005) ("The Committee on Curriculum and Research of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools found that a majority of schools responding to their survey had in
recent years added at least one course on 'populations historically differentially af-
fected by the law,' including Race/Ethnicity and the Law, American Indian/Native
American Law, and Critical Race Theory.") (footnotes omitted).
108. See e.g., Jeffrey S. Lehman, The Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Dis-
cussions of Affirmative Action from Bakke to Grutter, in DEFENDING DVERsIrTY: AFFIRM-
ATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 61 (Patricia Guinn et al. eds., 2004).
109. Dorothy A. Brown, The Tenth Annual Frankel Lecture: Address: Taking Grutter Seri-
ously: Getting Beyond the Numbers, in 43 Hous. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
110. Id.
111. For a general discussion of the way in which teaching about race can benefit all
students, see Rhonda V. Magee, Toward an Integral Critical Approach to Thinking, Talk-
ing, Writing and Teaching About Race, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 259 (2008). See also Angela
Mae Kupenda, Making Traditional Courses More Inclusive: Confessions of an African
American Female Professor Who Attempted to Crash All the Barriers at Once (1998), avail-
able at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/pocpwi3/7.
112. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE vii (1986). Dworkin, a prominent CLS adherent,
wrote, "We are subjects of law's empire, liegemen to its methods and ideals, bound
in spirit while we debate what we must therefore do."
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IX. CONCLUSION
While arguing for this inclusion, there is the concern that incorporat-
ing CRT as part of the broader program in legal education could mean its
absorption and ultimate disappearance.113 There are no doubt "transla-
tional risks"114 in incorporating CRT norms-risks of muddying its focus
with ideas from "alien, imported, or borrowed disciplines and their ac-
companying traditions."15 Nonetheless, the survival of CRT depends
upon broader recognition of the specific character of CRT-both its rich-
ness and its limitations.116 The richness must be nurtured. The limitations
must be honestly addressed with a goal of sharpening the criticality of the
genre. Both CRT adherents and the broader institution of legal pedagogy
must undertake such actions where they propound their doctrines.
Hence, the coda on which this essay ends involves a larger hope that Crit-
ical Race Theory norms will one day become Foucault's mirror, permeat-
ing the boundaries of the segregated spaces they inhabit and becoming
incorporated into the mainstream legal pedagogical canon.
113. Peter Goodrich, Sleeping With The Enemy: An Essay on the Politics of Critical Legal
Studies in America, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 389, 390-391 (1993) (discussing the way in
which CLS has become diffuse and been absorbed into the broader university).
114. Id. at 391.
115. Id. at 391-92.
116. Id. at 392.

